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1976] MORTMAIN STATUTES
ing with this phrase,73 the courts seem impressed that they are weighing
the factors to determine the need for prior notice and hearing.
74 If
public participation is allowed in another proceeding, due process stan-
dards may be satisfied. If not, the factors weighed attempt to illuminate
the significance of the administrative action. 75  Although there will be
disagreements over the delineation of appropriate factors and the deter-
mination of their relative influence, the purpose of section 553 is more
likley to be realized by "substantial effect" analysis than by the legisla-
tive-interpretative distinction applied in Eastern Kentucky.
WILLIAM D. DANNELLY
Constitutional Law-Mortmain Statutes-A Blow to an Old
and Ailing Statute
Mortmain statutes,' which restrict2 charitable bequests in wills3
executed within a specified period4 before the testator's death, were
incorporated from the Georgian Statute of Mortmain5 into the constitu-
73. "Substantial impact," like "interpretative rule," could be analyzed in terms of its
meaning rather than its underlying purpose of ferreting out the need for notice and
hearing prior to the rule's promulgation.
74. See cases cited notes 35-41 supra.
75. See text accompanying note 36 supra. While the coordination of these con-
siderations is complex, each illuminates a factor of importance. A complex and per-
vasive rule indicates a greater likelihood of agency error that might be discovered
through public participation. Drastic changes, retroactivity, and difficulty in com-
pliance with the rule all indicate that there are persons with a direct interest in the rule.
That there are those injured is probably indicative of the rule's importance.
1. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2507(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975) states, in
relevant part: "Any bequest or devise for religious or charitable purposes included in a
will or codicil executed within 30 days of the death of the testator shall be invalid to the
extent that someone who would benefit by its invalidity objects: Provided, That the
Commonwealth shall not have the right so to object .. "
2. Some statutes only limit the bequest, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 15-2-615 (Supp. 1972)
allows an unlimited bequest to charity provided the first $100,000 of the testators estate
goes to his lineal descendants.
3. Pennsylvania, for example, invalidates certain inter vivos transfers to charitable
organizations made within thirty days of death. Joslin, Legal Restrictions on Gifts to
Charities, 21 TENN. L. REV. 761,764 & n.19 (1951).
4. The prohibited period ranges from thirty days to one year before death. 1 W.
BoWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 3.16 (1960).
5. Also called the Charitable Uses Act. For a discussion of the history see W.
ROLLISON, VILLS §§ 168-70 (1970); Restrictions on Charitable Testamentary Gifts, 5
REAL PROPERTY, PROBAT & TRUST J. 290, 291 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Restrictions].
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tion and statutes of eleven American jurisdictions.7 These statutes
withstood challenges8 to their validity until 1972 when a district court in
In re Small9 found the District of Columbia statute to be a denial of
freedom of religion. 10 In 1974 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, iri In
re Estate of Cavill," became the first state supreme court to declare a
mortmain statute unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2
Twenty-four days before her death, 3 Leona Cavill executed a will
containing a charitable bequest.14  The orphan's court5 -held the be-
quest effective and concluded that section 7(1) of the Wills Act,"0
which would have invalidated the bequest, violated the due process,
privileges and immunities, and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.' 7  The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed,' 8 but invalidated the mortmain statute solely
on equal protection grounds. The dissent 9 supported the validity of
6. Miss. CONST. art. 14, § 270.
7. CAL. PROD. CODE §§ 40-43 (West 1956); D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-302 (1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-107 (1935); IDAHO CODE § 15-
2-615 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.266 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-5-31
(1972); MONT. RED. CODES ANN. § 91-142 (1947); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-3.3
(McKinney 1967); Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.06 (Page 1954); and PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 2507(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1975).
8. Taylor v. Payne, 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666
(1944); Decker v. American Univ., 236 Iowa 895, 20 N.W.2d 466 (1945); In re
Kruger's Will, 23 App. Div. 2d 664, 257 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1965); Patton v. Patton, 39 Ohio
St. 590 (1883).
9. Administration No. 2507-70 (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 1972).
10. Id. at 3.
11. - Pa. -, 329 A.2d 503 (1974).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The "holding is likewise mandated by the
prohibition of special laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution. Pa. Const. art. 111, § 32,
P.S." 329 A.2d at 505 n.7.
13. The prohibited period in Pennsylvania is thirty days before death. See note I
supra.
14. The residue of decedent's estate was to be divided among The American Heart
Association, The American Cancer Society Incorporated, The American Foundation for
the Blind, Boys Town of Boys Town, Nebraska and Zem Zem Hospital for Crippled
Children of Erie, Pa. 329 A.2d at 504 n.2.
15. Cavill Estate (Pa. O.C. 1973), discussed in, 56 ERiu COUN'rY LEGAL J. 44
(1974).
16. Act of April 14, 1947, § 7(1) [1947] Pa. Laws 89. The court also invalidated
the amended version of the mortmain statute. "[Testatrix died while the 1947 Act was
in effect .... Since section 7(1) and section 2507(1) are identical in effect, [the
court's] analysis of section 7(1) is equally applicable to section 2507(1)." 329 A.2d at
504 n.1.
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
18. 329 A.2d 503.
19. Id. at 506.
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the statute20 against both equal protection and due process attacks.
Traditional equal protection analysis recognizes the right of a state
to erect necessary statutory classifications, 21 within certain limitations.
The state must prove a "compelling state interest ' 22 if the personal right
contravened by the classification is "fundamental, ' 2 3 suoh as the right to
vote,24 travel, ' ' procreate,20 work,27 or the freedom of religion28 or
association. 29  This rigid "strict scrutiny test ' 10 also adheres if the
classification is "suspect,"'" such as one based on race,3 2 national ori-
gin,33 or alienage. 4 But if neither fundamental rights nor suspect
classifications are involved, the constitutionality of the statutory classifi-
cation must be evaluated under the "rational basis test."35 The laxity
36
of that test is indicated by the famous formulation in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.: 7
[Tihe existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis.
38
The rational basis test has been applied to the regulation of com-
20. The dissent would limit invalidation to the 1947 version "[blecause the
language of the two provisions is not identical ....... Id. at 506 n.1.
21. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341, 344 (1949).
22. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 813 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416
U.S. 1 (1974).
23. Id.
24. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
25. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
26. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
27. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
28. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
29. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
30. The test is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
31. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 H~Av. L. REv. 1065, 1101
(1969).
32. Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
33. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948).
34. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
35. Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071, 1073 (1974).
36. From 1937 to 1972, only one law was invalidated using the rational basis test.
See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights:
Another A pproach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 811 (1973).
37. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
38. Id. at 152.
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mercial activity,3 9 social benefits,40 and taxation.41 The United States
Supreme Court has even applied the rational basis test in the area of
decedents' estates. In Labine v. Vincent42 the Supreme Court upheld
the Louisiana intestate succession law which excluded illegitimate chil-
dren from inheriting equally with legitimate children of an intestate
natural father.43
Prior equal protection challenges to the constitutionality of mort-
main statutes have traditionally invoked the rational basis test. In
Taylor v. Payne44 the Florida Supreme Court determined that that
state's mortmain statute did not deny the testator equal protection
because the state had the right to control the "testamentary alienation of
property. '45  The court found the purpose of the statute to be legiti-
mate: "to protect the widow and children from improvident gifts made
to their neglect by the testator. ' 46 A year later, in Decker v. American
University,47 the Iowa Supreme Court found that state's mortmain stat-
ute constitutional because it was "enacted to correct the evil of making
bequests for charitable purposes to the detriment of those who should be
the object of the testator's bounty." 48
In the face of these decisions, the court in Cavill relied upon an
unsophisticated version of the rational basis test" and found the mort-
main statute irrationally under-inclusive as well as over-inclusive.10 The
majority characterized the classification as a specious, temporal one that
gave effect to or voided a testator's bequest according to the accident of
the lapse of time5' between the execution of a will and the death of the
39. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
40. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549-51 (1972).
41. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937).
42. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
43. Id. at 538-39.
44. 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615, appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 666 (1944).
45. Id. at 362-63, 17 So. 2d at 617.
46. Id. at 364, 17 So. 2d at 618.
47. 236 Iowa 895,20 N.W.2d 466 (1945).
48. Id. at 902, 20 N.W.2d at 469.
49. 329 A.2d at 506. There is no possibility of applying the strict scrutiny test as
there is no fundamental right or suspect classification involved in Cavill. There has been
scholarly opinion to the effect that there is an emerging standard of review, a "newer
equal protection" being applied by the Court under the guise of the rational basis test.
The Court appears to be employing an intermediate standard of review in some cases
when the strict scrutiny test is unavailable and when the minimal scrutiny of the rational
basis test is ineffectual, supra note 35. E.g., Gunther, supra note 30. But the Supreme
Court has never actually said that an intermediate standard exists, so it cannot be relied
upon.
50. 329 A.2d at 506; see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 21, at 347-53.
51. 329 A.2d at 505-06.
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testator. 5 2  In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the State's
argument that the classification was rationally related to the legislative
purpose of proscribing undue influence by charitable or religious orga-
nizations to the detriment of dependent heirs. 3
The dissent in Cavill argued that the rational basis test does not
require a "statute drawn with mathematical precision"54 as long as that
classification has a rational basis to a permissible state interest. How-
ever, if the state interest is protection of heirs who rely upon the testator
for support and who are the natural objects of his bounty, a classifica-
tion scheme that allows distant, even unknown legal heirs to challenge a
charitable bequest is only questionably related.55 If the state interest is,
on the other hand, protection of the testator from undue influence by
charitable or religious organizations, the rights of those charities become
the focus; theoretically, this is not a question of denial of equal protec-
tion but a violation of due process, and the standard of review changes
dramatically."'
By finding the classification arbitrary, the court in Cavill avoids
hypothesizing a statutory purpose and ruling on its permissibility. In
contrast, the focus in Taylor v. Payne and Decker v. American Universi-
ty was the permissibility of the objective, a focus that assumed the non-
capriciousness of the classification.
Mortmain statutes were originally enacted in England to prevent
ecclesiastical control of land in which the feudal overlords had an
interest. The statutes appeared in two forms: 57 the true "mortmain"
statutes',8 based on Magna Carta provisions that prohibited the holding
of real estate by charities;, 9 and the statutes now commonly called
"mortmain" based upon the Georgian Statute of Mortmain, which
52. Id. at 505.
53. Id. at 506.
54. Id. at 509, based on the criteria set out in Lindsley v. Natural Carbohic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
55. 329 A.2d at 506. In Cavill, the complaining heirs are nieces and nephews of
the decedent.
56. This alternative legislative purpose is postulated in In re Gredler's Estate, 361
Pa. 384, 389, 65 A.2d 404, 407 (1949). "[A] discussion of whether an irrebuttable
presumption rationally relates to a legislative end is confusing and unnecessary." Note,
Irrebuttable Presumptions as an Alternative to Strict Scrutiny: From Rodriguez to
LaFleur, 62 GEo. L.J. 1173, 1198 (1974).
57. Restrictions, supra note 5, at 290.
58. Id. The term "mortmain" should not technically be applied to statutes which
restrict the donor from making charitable bequests. See In re Estate of Dwyer, 159 Cal.
680, 115 P. 242 (1911); A. ScoTr, 5 TRusTs § 589(3)(c), at 3885 (1967).
59. Restrictions, supra note 5, at 290.
60. The Georgian Statute of Mortmain is also known as the Charitable Uses Act.
W. RoLLsoN, supra note 5, § 168.
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restricted the power to devise property to charity. The two forms
focused on the rights of different parties; the former limited the rights of
the donee-charity and the latter restricted the donor-testator. The
statutes were also designed to benefit different parties. The Magna
Carta provisions empowered only overlords or the crown to set aside the
transfer, whereas the Georgian Statute of Mortmain gave descendants of
the testator that right.6 '
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cavill0 2 focused its equal
protection analysis on the donor-testator.63 This choice of focus helps
distinguish the case from Labine v. Vincent 4 which the dissent consid-
ered crucial. 65 The statute reviewed in Cavill is historically related to
the Georgian Statute of Mortmain:16 both the English and the Pennsyl-
vania statutes center on the rights of the donor and the benefit to the
legal heirs.
The intestate succession statute in Labine, however, is functionally
similar to the older mortmain statute based on provisions in the Magna
Carta. The Magna Carta mortmain statute permitted the crown or an
overlord to prevent a charity from receiving a bequest; the property
bequeathed redounded to the state upon exercise of this power 1 The
Louisiana intestate law was intended to further a social organization that
relies upon the nuclear family and to establish an orderly intestate
succession system that would duplicate the probable property distribu-
tion of the decedent.0 8  The rights of the potential donee, the illegiti-
mate in Labine, are subjugated to the state's interest in a particular
social fabric, as the charities' rights bowed to the interests of the crown
under the Magna Carta provisions. In contrast, the rights of the donor-
testator under a mortmain statute should bow only to the testator's
obligation to his dependent heirs, as under the Georgian Statute of
Mortmain.
61. Restrictions, supra note 5, at 296.
62. 329 A.2d 503.
63. There is obviously some confusion by the court on this point. The court
"conclude[s] that section 7(1) denies the charitable beneficiaries equal protection of the
laws." Id. at 505 (footnote omitted). Yet the analysis clearly evaluates the classification
of testators.
64. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
65. 329 A.2d at 508.
66. Remick, Restrictions on Gilts for Religious or Charitable Uses, 51 Dicm. L,
REv. 201,202 (1947).
67. The Pennsylvania statute limits invalidation of the bequest "to the extent that
someone who would benefit by its invalidity objects: Provided, That the Commonwealth
shall not have the right so to object .... "PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2507(1) (Spec.
Pamphlet 1975).
68. 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971).
436 [Vol. 54
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Applying the rational basis test to each statute, the Louisiana
intestate succession law must rationally relate to the state interest in a
particular social fabric, whereas the classification of donors under the
Pennsylvania mortmain statute must effectuate the protection of de-
pendent heirs. The classification in Labine is neither over-inclusive
nor under-inclusive in relation to the state's interest in its social structure
while the classification in Cavill is susceptible to both challenges. A
further distinguishing factor is that a mortmain statute subverts the stated
intention of the decedent, while the intestate succession law at least
purports to honor it.
There are numerous grounds on which a mortmain statute can be
attacked. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated that state's
statute on equal protection grounds,69 although the orphan's court had
suggested equal protection, due process, and privileges and immunities
violations. In In re Small70 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia utilized the first amendment freedom of religion to
invalidate the District of Columbia mortmain statute, a ground peculiar-
ly available to challenge that jurisdiction's statute.7' There was also a
hint of equal protection "strict scrutiny" analysis when the court in In re
Small stated that "at least [religious institutions] should be in these cir-
cumstances in an equal position [with other beneficiaries]. I can see
no compelling Government necessity or otherwise for the Government to
interfere . ",72
A stronger weapon than equal protection to be raised against the
mortmain statute might be procedural due process. The dissent in
Cavill discussed it73 and a District of Columbia probate court relied
upon it in Doyle v. Key.74 The court in Doyle traced the denial of due
process:
[t]hat a will procured by undue influence is invalid . . . requires
no citation of authority. That the statute in question creates an
irrebuttable presumption of undue influence is also clear ...
Thus, if 18 D.C. Code 302 is valid, the legacies here involved are
void without regard to the factual absence of any kind of undue
influence. 75
69. See note 12 supra.
70. Administration No. 2507-70 (D.D.C., Feb. 7, 1972).
71. The D.C. mortmain statute is unique in that it restricts only bequests to
religious organizations. D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-302 (1973).
72. Administration No. 2507-70 at 4.
73. 329 A.2d at 510-11.
74. Administration No. 2188-72 (Super. Ct. D.C., P. Div., Feb. 13, 1975).
75. Id. at 6.
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Despite the linguistic maneuvers of the dissent in Cavill,78 the
practical effect of a legislative "prohibition" restricting charitable be-
quests is not distinguishable from an irrebuttable presumption of undue
influence: both restrict charities from taking bequests. Admittedly, the
presumption may be rebutted by "obtaining the consent of all other
interested parties"'7 or by "proving the existence of a prior will" 78 with
substantially the same gift. But the first solution allows a necessarily
interested party, the potential beneficiary, to be a judge in his own cause
and denies the charity a right to an impartial hearing on the presump-
tion. The second solution is only available when there is an extant prior
will.
Application of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine has been
criticized by commentators as an ad hoc analysis utilized to circumvent
the often harsh standards of equal protection review. 9 The objection
has been that the challenge is actually a complaint of differing treatment
of persons "similarly situated with respect to the underlying purposes of
the rule."8 A challenge to a mortmain statute need not be vulnerable
to that objection. The challenge is that the classification is a depriva-
tion of due process; the classification is tantamount to an irrebuttable
presumption of undue influence and unprincipled activity by the chari-
table beneficiary. The purpose of the summary classification is not to
provide for governmental efficiency"' nor to maintain a social order
2
but to relieve individual heirs from the burden of establishing culpable
activity or corrupt intent on the part of charitable beneficiaries.8 3 The
classification fails as a denial of due process not justified by the statutory
purpose of circumventing due process of law. Furthermore, in a chal-
lenge to the validity of a mortmain statute, employment of the irrebutta-
ble presumption doctrine would permit success without reliance upon a
judicial conclusion of capricious classification.
76. 'This distinction between a conclusive presumption and a flat prohibition is not
one without a difference when the constitutional implications of a state's legislative
action are at stake." 329 A.2d at 510 (footnote omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. E.g., Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. Rn'v.
449 (1975).
80. Id. at 465 n.78.
81. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
82. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
83. In order to submit the issue of undue influence to a jury, four elements must be
proven: (1) that the testator was susceptible to influence; (2) that there was opportunity
to influence; (3) that the influencer was disposed to influence the testator unduly; and
(4) that the coveted bequest actually resulted. Note, Testamentary Undue Influence in
Iowa, 18 DRAKE L. REv. 255, 258 (1969).
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PUBLIC FORUM
Mortmain statutes have been whittled away at by state legisla-
tures,8 ' evaded by estate planners, 5 and criticized by scholars and
practicing lawyers.8 6 Finally they have been invalidated by the courts.
The combination of In re Small, In re Estate of CavilI, and Doyle v. Key
represents a frontal attack on the mortmain statute as an anachronistic
feudal holdover. Other courts confronted with challenges to mortmain
statutes should consider whether a state's role in policing the distribution
of a decedent's estate ought to extend beyond guaranteeing dependent
heirs continued support. Invalidation of a mortmain statute does not
deny those heirs a right to complain of undue influence by an offending
charitable organization. Rather, the intervention of the courts leaves
that remedy healthy while, hopefully, tolling the demise of the mortmain
statute.
ELIZABETH ANANIA
Constitutional Law-Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad:
A Contemporary Concept of the Public Forum
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad' the United States
Supreme Court held that municipal auditoriums in Chattanooga, Ten-
nessee "were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities."2 The Court looked in part to the traditional public forum
cases (those involving streets and parks) "I for the relevant criteria for its
84. E.g., "By recent amendment the Idaho mortmain statute now permits an
unlimited bequest to charity even within the proscribed thirty-day period, provided the
first $100,000 goes to the lineal descendants of the testator." I W. BOWE & D. PARKER,
supra note 4, § 3.16, at 1973-74 Supp. 15 (footnote omitted); see also Restrictions, supra
note 5, at 297.
85. Various "avoidance techniques" are catalogued in Fisch, Restrictions on Chari-
table Giving, 10 N.Y.L.F. 307, 325-31 (1964). These include substitutional and
conditional dispositions, in terroram and no-contest clauses, dependent relative revoca-
tion, contracts to bequeath and inter vivos dispositions.
86. Id.; Hollinger, Decedents' Estates & Trusts Laws, Annual Survey of Pennsyl-
vania Legal Developments, 45 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 221, 229 (1974); Remick, supra note 66;
and Restrictions, supra note 5, at 298-99.
1. 420U.S. 546 (1975).
2. Id. at 555.
3. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395 (1953); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
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